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This Court has jurisdiction under UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES /STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the action 
under URCP 41(b). Pitman v. Bonham, 677 P. 1126, 1127 (Utah 1984) This issue 
was preserved in Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth 
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss and (2) in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to 
Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 207) and Memorandum 
in Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 269). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the action against 
Defendant Beth Quintana was barred by the statute of limitations. This is a legal 
conclusion that the appellate court reviews for correctness. Quick Safe-THitch, 
Inc. v. RSB Systems, L.C., 2000 UT 84, flO, 12 P.3d 577 This issue was preserved 
in Plaintiffs Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth Quintana's 
Motion to Dismiss and (2) in support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to Amend 
and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 207) and Memorandum in Reply 
to Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 269). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant Evergreen Products, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, on December 17, 2001 (R. 1). As explained in the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 53), the 
action was for breach of written contract (Share Purchase Agreement). Plaintiffs 
performance thereunder was memorialized by a series of checks, which started 
March 22, 1996. Therefore, the statute of limitations was six (6) years. UCA § 78-
12-23(2) 
The corporation was involuntarily dissolved prior to the filing of the action 
(R. 233). Therefore, the action was also filed against the corporation's 
shareholders and directors. The date of dissolution is unknown, but it had to be 
after April 1, 1998, which is the date the corporation first became "delinquent." 
(Id.) Plaintiff did not discover the fact of dissolution until October 18, 2001, 
which is the date her counsel pulled online records about the corporation from the 
Utah Division of Corporations (RR. 223, ^ 16-17^ 224, ffl2-3). Therefore, the 
action was timely filed even if the 3-year limitation period in UCA § 78-12-27 is 
applicable. 
At the time the action was filed (December 17, 2001), Plaintiff had 
Defendant Quintana's address as "Green Flower Court, 4570 South 860 East, Apt. 
2 
7, Murray UT 84107" (R. 222, ffi[7-8). However, Plaintiff did not have an address 
for the other Defendants (Id. at J^19). Plaintiff did not discover an address for the 
other Defendants until January 15, 2002 (Id. at ffl[19 & 21). At the same time, 
Plaintiff also identified an alternative "Apt. No. 10" for Ms. Quintana (Id. at [^20). 
Accordingly, Summons were issued and went out for service on all Defendants. 
The Summons and Complaint to Defendant Quintana were returned (April 
29, 2002) with the following statement: "After due search and diligent inquiry this 
office has become reliably informed that the party being served in this case cannot 
be located or will not voluntarily submit to service of process at the address(es) 
indicated."1 The Summons and Complaint to Defendant Frederick G. Ninow were 
likewise returned (R. 28). 
In the meantime, Defendant Frederick P. Ninow was served (May 5, 2002). 
He was named because the first in the series of payments (R. 17) was issued to 
"Fred Ninow." Based on experience in another case (Liao v. Ninow a/k/a Fred 
Ninow, Case No. 990908561), Defendant Ninow was known to go by the name, 
"Fred Ninow." 
1
 Incorrectly stated to be "(April 22,2002)." (R. 225,16) 
3 
All of this was explained in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick P. Ninow (R. 15). However, the trial 
court granted the Motion in a Minute Entry entered June 11, 2002 (R. 26). 
At this point, Plaintiff had no good address for Defendants Quintana or 
Ninow. To be sure, Plaintiff had the Summons to Defendant Quintana reissued 
(March 26, 2004) with the statement ("check with Apartment Office)." This was 
returned with the statement: "Defendant is unknown at this address, no 
forwarding." (RR. 222, %99 225, fj) 
When this happened, Plaintiff continued investigating by contacting 
Defendant Quintana's ex-husband who continued living at the apartment complex. 
However, he gave no information (R. 222, ffi[10-l 1). Plaintiff considered serving 
Defendant Quintana at church, but learned that she was going to church at different 
locations (Id. atffl[12-13). 
While pursuing this investigation, Plaintiff came up with an apartment 
number (103) for Defendant Ninow (R. 223, f22). As shown by the records of the 
trial court, service on Defendant Ninow was made May 15, 2004 (R. 28). 
As stated above, Defendant Ninow filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims 
Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 42). Even though the caption of the motion was 
4 
limited to Defendant Ninow, it was evident that he made the motion on behalf of 
Defendant Quintana. (R. 43,1fij3-4)2 
On this basis, Plaintiff served a proposed Order requiring an answer from 
Defendant Quintana (R. 72). Defendant Quintana objected (R. 69), and the trial 
court sustained the objection by handwritten revision to the Order Denying Motion 
to Dismiss Claims Against Frederick G. Ninow (R. 73). Once again, Plaintiff was 
left without service on Defendant Quintana. 
In the meantime, Plaintiff and Defendant Ninow proceeded to litigate the 
action. On March 22, 2005, Plaintiff served a Discovery Plan and Case 
Management Order. Defendant Ninow's response was a Request for Extension of 
Time to Respond to Discovery Plan (R. 77). 
In the Request for Extension, Defendant Ninow stated: "Defendant seeks 
additional time of one month, to May 9, 2005, to obtain an attorney so that he can 
be adequately represented." (R. 77) On April 19, 2005, the trial court entered an 
Order Granting Extension of Time (R. 79). Plaintiff took no action when May 9, 
2005 came and went. 
2
 Though the motion was filed pro se, it, along with all of the other papers filed by Defendant Ninow, appeared to be 
attorney-drafted. 
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On May 18, 2005, Defendant Ninow filed a second Request for Extension of 
Time (R. 84). In this one, Defendant Ninow stated: "Defendant has had a heart 
attack and his health is such that he has not been able to meet with Legal Aid." 
(Id.) There was no corroboration for this, and the trial court did not grant 
Defendant Ninow's proposed Order Granting Extension of Time. 
Plaintiff waited a few months and then served a Request for Entry of Case 
Management Order (R.86). This time, there was no response. The Request was 
simply returned, unopened. Defendant Ninow made no further attempt to 
communicate with plaintiff or the trial court. 
As a result, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions (R. 91). The motion was 
returned, unopened with the statement that it had been "Refused." Based on this, 
plaintiff filed a Notice re: Refusal of Service (R. 96). This was also returned, 
unopened with the statement that it had been "Refused." 
The Motion for Sanctions was granted March 16, 2006 (R. 98). Plaintiff 
waited a while longer and filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (R. 100). 
Default Judgment was entered August 8, 2006 (R. 108). 
Shortly after, Plaintiff became aware of Defendant Ninow's death. Plaintiff 
reluctantly determined, based on everything stated above, that Defendant Ninow5 s 
6 
funeral was the only way to effect personal service on Defendant Quintana (R. 
222, TJ14). This was done October 10, 2006 (R. 110). 
On October 30, 2006, Defendant Quintana filed a Request for Extension of 
Time to Answer Complaint asking until November 30, 2006 (R. 113). On 
November 30, 2006, Defendant Quintana filed her Answer (R. 117). 
Defendant Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (by counsel) was filed the same 
day she responded to Plaintiffs First Requests for Production of Documents (R. 
127). These Requests were served March 19, 2007 (R. 123). However, Defendant 
Quintana was given an open extension, and there was no objection to three (3) 
month delay. 
At no time, during the prior course of this action, did any party file 
application under URCP 4(b) that the action be dismissed. The trial court took no 
such action itself. In fact, at no time during the course of this action did the trial 
court issue an order to show cause. It was obviously satisfied with the progress of 
the case, at least, until Defendant Quintana raised the issue, for the first time, many 
years after the fact. 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum (1) in Opposition to Defendant Beth 
Quintana5 s Motion to Dismiss and (2) in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to 
amend and Enlargement of Time to Service Summons (R. 207). As the Court can 
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see, this was accompanied by a Motion for Leave to Amend and Enlargement of 
Time to Serve Summons (R. 205). Both were supported by Affidavits of Plaintiff 
and her undersigned counsel (RR. 221, 224). 
Defendant Quintana filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to 
amend and Reply in Support of Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (R. 
238). The matter was finally submitted to the trial court (R. 273). 
Without hearing, and in a Minute Entry, the trial court granted Defendant 
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss, and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend 
and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons (R. 275). It took a while, and 
objections from Plaintiff, but on October 23, 2007, the trial court finally entered an 
Amended [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 309). 
On November 21, 2007, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal (R. 317). 
However, the day before that, Defendant Quintana's counsel filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal (R. 314). On February 15, 2008, Plaintiff had Defendant Quintana 
served with a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel. The service was "Return to 
Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward." However, it is 
obvious that it was received. 
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On March 4, 2008, Defendant Quintana wrote this Court, from the same 
address to which the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel had been mailed, and 
stated: "Be advised that in as much as I have not retained legal representation yet, 
please forward all information and correspondence to: Beth Quintana, 764 South 
800 East, #103, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts relevant to the issues presented for review have been stated in the 
foregoing Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of 
URCP 4(b), and never credited Plaintiffs substantial efforts to serve Defendant 
Quintana and prosecute the action against the other Defendants. URCP 4(b) is not 
self-executing. The 120-day service rule does not come into effect unless and until 
some action is taken by the court or the parties. No action was taken by any of the 
Defendants, or the trial court, until after Defendant Quintana was served. As it 
turned out, the only way for Plaintiff to obtain personal service was at the funeral 
of Defendant Quintana's father. There is some indication that Defendant Quintana 
knew about the action, and Plaintiffs multiple efforts to serve her, but she took no 
action herself during the time it took to get her served. This was something that 
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should have been factored into the trial court's decision, but was not. Plaintiff did 
not fail to adequately prosecute this action, and the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing under URCP 41(b). 
2. The underlying action is for breach of written contract. Therefore, the 
applicable statute of limitations is six years. UCA § 78-12-23(2) The trial court 
ruled that the action is not for a penalty, forfeiture or liability imposed or created 
by law. UCA § 78-12-27 Therefore, the 3-year statute of limitations does not 
apply. Even if it did, Plaintiff did not "discover" the cause of action against 
Defendant Quintana until October 18, 2001. No time for performance was 
established in the Share Purchase Agreement. Therefore, a "reasonable" time must 
be implied, which means that the action was filed within the 4-year statute of 
limitations. UCA § 78-12-25 No matter how the action is viewed, it was timely 
filed. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON AN 
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF URCP 4(b), AND DID NOT 
CREDIT THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS TO SERVE DEFENDANT 
QUINTANA AND PROSECUTE THE ACTION AGAINST THE 
OTHER DEFENDANTS. 
Defendant Quintana9 s primary point has been that the 120-day service rule 
in URCP 4(b) is "self-executing.55 However, the contrary can be seen from its 
10 
express language: "If the summons and the complaint are not timely served, the 
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon 
the court's own initiative" (emphasis added) 
The question in Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1994) was 
when a previously filed action "failed" for purpose of the savings statute, UCA 
§ 78-12-40. Defendant claimed the action failed when plaintiff failed to serve the 
summons and complaint within 120 days. However, the Court ruled that the action 
did not fail until the court took action to dismiss it. This was because: 
[F]ailure of a cause of action under Rule 4(b) is not automatic. As 
Rule 4(b) states, dismissal of the cause of action after the time for 
service of a summons has elapsed depends upon some action, namely, 
the "application of any party or upon the court's own initiative." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 4(b) In the case before us, such action was not taken until 
January 27, 1992, when the court, apparently on its own initiative, 
dismissed the complaint. 
877 P.2d at 1261-62 
In this case, there was no such action until after service of the Summons and 
Complaint. By then, it was too late: "Thus, unless and until a cause of action is 
dismissed, a party who fails to serve a summons in a timely fashion may preserve 
the action under proper circumstances." 877 P.2d at 1262 
11 
Defendant Quintana cited some new authority in her Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend and Reply in Support of Defendant Beth 
Quintana's Motion to Dismiss: Hunter v. Sunrise Title, 2004 UT 1. It was not 
surprising that this case was dead last in Defendant Quintana's brief (RR. 255-56). 
It has no bearing in this case. 
The basis for the court's ruling was "formal dismissal" of co-defendants. 
f l 1 In that case, plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, and on the 
merits, of two of the three defendants. [^4 It is obvious that if plaintiff had not 
stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice and on the merits, the Court's restrictive 
reading of URCP 4(b) would not have applied. 
The reason for this is URCP 54(b), which was not mentioned in Defendant 
Quintana's brief: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action,.. .and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
12 
In Hunter v. Sunrise Title, the two dismissed defendants moved for 
summary judgment, "which resulted in the dismissal of all but one of Hunter's 
claims. Thereafter, Hunter settled the lone remaining claim against Benson and 
RS West and agreed to dismiss his complaint against those two defendants only, 
with prejudice and upon the merits. The district court then entered ^formal order 
of dismissal on June 22, 2000." f4 (emphasis added) At this point, in the words of 
URCP 54(b), the action was "terminated" against those defendants, and there was 
nothing to which the saving provision in URCP 54(b) could apply. 
This is simply not the case here. When the trial court granted dismissal of 
Defendant Frederick P. Ninow, it was over Plaintiffs objection and without 
stipulation. Therefore, the action was not terminated against the remaining 
Defendants. Indeed, the trial court's determination on this issue was "subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and 
the rights and liabilities of all parties." URCP 54(b) As a result, there was no basis 
in this case for the Hunter court's strained interpretation of URCP 4(b). 
In Plaintiffs view, the action was preserved by service of the other 
Defendants, which first occurred within months of the filing of the action (May 5, 
2002). As a result, nothing would have been served by requiring Plaintiffs 
application under 4(b) for an enlargement of time. However, to be safe, Plaintiff 
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made such an application at the same time she responded to Defendant Quintana's 
Motion to Dismiss. Under the circumstances, as shown above, there was "good 
cause" for such an application. There was certainly no basis for dismissal under 
URCP 4(b). 
Over the years, Plaintiff made three separate attempts to serve Defendant 
Quintana. The first two were at the address she claims was known to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff went so tar as to inquire of Defendant Quintana's ex-husband who was 
still living at the apartment complex, but (perhaps, understandably) he would not 
give any information as to her whereabouts. 
After these attempts failed, Plaintiff considered serving Defendant Quintana 
at church. Plaintiff fully investigated the matter, but learned that she did not go to 
church in the same location. Therefore, Plaintiff abandoned those efforts. 
This left serving Defendant Quintana at her father's funeral. Certainly, not a 
preferred method, but the unavailing attempts left Plaintiff with no option. 
Defendant Quintana argued, and the trial court (paradoxically) agreed that 
Defendant Quintana could have been served by "other means." While there were 
indications that Defendant Quintana had knowledge of the action and was avoiding 
service, it is likely that the trial court would have denied service by other means. 
14 
After all, the trial court refused to treat Defendant Quintana as having 
appeared in the action when her father expressly and formally acted on her behalf 
(R. 73). The Court can search this record in vain for plain, undeniable evidence 
that Defendant Quintana was avoiding service. There was certainly nothing that 
would have satisfied URCP 4(d)(4)(A). 
Plaintiff was satisfied that service by publication, or other means, would not 
have reached Defendant Quintana. There was no indication that service by mail 
would have reached her. Service by other means would not have served due 
process or substantial justice. It is curious that Plaintiff should be penalized for 
abiding by these constitutional imperatives. 
As for the other Defendants, Plaintiff has explained everything that went 
into the significant efforts to get them served and what went into prosecution of the 
action against them. Those efforts were certainly more than minimal. 
Defendant Quintana's principal case was Country Meadows Convalescent 
Center v. Utah Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993). The cases are 
easily distinguishable. Plaintiff in that case did nothing for more than five years. 
In response to a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, plaintiff finally filed a 
motion for summary judgment. 
15 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute certainly made sense in that case, but it 
does not here. There was never a time that Plaintiff was not pursuing the action. It 
may be that Plaintiff was pursuing the action, at certain times, against other 
Defendants, but this certainly made sense. Plaintiff hoped that judgment against 
one Defendant would make prosecution of the rest of the action unnecessary. 
More to the point, this is not a case where Plaintiff took action only in 
response to action by one of the Defendants. Defendant Quintana's Motion to 
Dismiss was in direct response to action that Plaintiff had taken, namely, 
Defendant Quintana's personal service, which is something the court in Country 
Meadows considered to be significant.3 The seriousness of Plaintiff s efforts is 
evidenced by the fact that she persisted in her service efforts until they were 
successful. 
It is significant that at no time did the trial court ever issue an Order to Show 
Cause. This is some proof that the trial court was satisfied with the progress of the 
case. There was no basis for dismissal under URCP 41(b). 
In sum, we commend the following as the best statement of Plaintiff s 
position on the matter: 
3
 "Country Meadows, on the other hand, had made no attempt to reactivate its case prior to UDOH's dismissal 
motion." 851 P.2d atl216 (emphasis added) 
16 
[I]t is appropriate to have in mind some established principles 
applicable to such situations. It is not to be doubted that in order to 
handle the business of the court with efficiency and expedition the 
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion in 
dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward 
according to the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse. But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable 
and arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether there is 
such justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more 
factors than merely the length of time since the suit was filed. Some 
consideration should be given to the conduct of both parties, and to 
the opportunity each has had to move the case forward and what they 
have done about it; and also what difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused to the other side; and most important, whether injustice 
may result from the dismissal. 
Applying those principles here, these observations are pertinent: 
although there was unusual delay in getting this case to trial, this was 
due in large part to the unusual circumstances delineated above. 
Further, we are not impressed that the defendants themselves were 
overly diligent or manifest any particular haste in getting the pretrial 
discovery procedures completed and on with the trial. They did not 
do so in responsive action to Westinghouse's having assembled 
records, nor to the latterfs messages concerning their availability, nor 
did they seek any assistance from the court. 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move 
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is 
even more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the 
existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard 
and to do justice between them. In conformity with that principle the 
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments 
where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) 
17 
II. THE 6-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE. 
The action against defendant Evergreen Products, Inc. was for breach of 
written contract (Share Purchase Agreement). Actions on a written contract have a 
6-year statute of limitations. UCA § 78-12-23(2) It was alleged that Defendant 
Quintana is liable because the assets of the corporation were transferred to her and 
that she continued the operations of the corporation after it was dissolved. Either 
way, once the fact of personal liability is established, the basis for claim is the 
same, and the director or shareholder is liable to the same extent as the 
corporation. 
The basis for the claim of personal liability is Grosjean v. Ross, 572 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1977) (creditor of subject corporation permitted recovery from 
shareholder to whom assets of the corporation had been transferred); and Steenblik 
v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995) (individual defendants held liable for 
continuing the corporation's business after it had been administratively 
suspended). There is nothing in either case indicating that the individual's liability 
is different from the corporation's. 
Defendants in Grosjean, supra, made the same argument here: UCA § 78-
12-27 bars this action because it was not filed within the 3-year limitation period. 
18 
However, the Court (citing American Theatre Co. v. Glassmann, 80 P.2d 922 
(1938)) rejected this argument because the claim against the individual defendants 
was not for a penalty, forfeiture or liability imposed or created by law. 
Importantly, the trial court considered and rejected this very argument in the 
case below. Defendant Frederick G. Ninow filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims 
based on the 3-year statute of limitations in UCA § 78-12-27. However, for the 
reasons stated above, the trial court denied the Motion. (R. 67) In doing so, the 
trial court implicitly determined that the 6-year statute of limitations in UCA § 78-
12-23(2) was applicable in this case. 
However, if the claim against Defendant Quintana is viewed on the basis of 
UCA §§ 78-12-27, it cannot be barred. Plaintiff did not discover the basis for 
Defendant Quintana's personal liability until October 18, 2001, Russell Packard 
Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ffl[21-25, 108 P.3d 741 (the "equitable 
discovery rule"). This was well within the 3-year statute of limitations. 
The trial court never addressed application of the "equitable discovery rule." 
In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is true that determining when a plaintiff should reasonably have 
discovered the facts sufficient to establish a cause of action and 
whether a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances are both 
fact-intensive inquiries that preclude judgment as a matter of law in 
all but the clearest of cases. While these questions are usually left to 
19 
the trial court, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the 
facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the 
underlying facts or about the application of the governing legal 
standard to the facts. 
Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re Hoopiiaina Trust), 2006 UT 53, ^ }37, 144 P.3d 
1129 (quotations, citations omitted) 
Both Plaintiffs assignee and the undersigned counsel testified there was no 
knowledge of the claim against Defendant Quintana until October 18, 2001. This 
action was filed within a month (December 17, 2001). There was absolutely no 
question about the application of the "equiptable discovery rule" to this case. No 
matter how the case is viewed, it was timely filed. 
Defendant Quintana also raised the 4-year statute of limitations in UCA § 
78-12-25. However, there was no telling when default occurred under the Share 
Purchase Agreement. The contract does not state a term for performance: "Money 
is to be received as needed to help promote the growth of said company." (R. 182) 
If the payments were a "loan," the date of repayment must be known to 
determine if and when the statute of limitations has run. According to Defendant 
Quintana, the statute of limitations started to run the date the payments were made, 
but this made no sense whatsoever. Absent an express term, a reasonable term 
20 
would be implied, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 
1998), and there is no way to know, on the basis of this record, what that time was. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Minute Entry (R. 275) and Order 
Granting Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss (R. 309) should be 
VACATED and REVERSED. 
DATED this of March, 2008. 
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC 
VA^^cy^j iK^ By. 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS WILL CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the within and 
foregoing "Appellant's Opening Brief were mailed, First Class, postage prepaid, 
this _\Ov^day of March, 2008, to: 
Beth Quintana 
764 South 800 East #103 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 i 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHING-PING LIAO, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 010911458 
vs. : 
EVERGREEN PRODUCTS, INC., : 
FREDERICK P. NINOW, FREDERICK G. 
NINOW, BETH QUINTANA, DOES I-XX, : 
Defendants. : 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
Plaintiff seeking a ruling on his Motion for Leave to Amend and 
Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons and Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion 
to Dismiss. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has requested oral 
argument on the Motions. While the Motion to Dismiss is dispositive, the 
Court determines that a hearing on this Motion is not necessary and would 
not assist the Court because the issues have been clearly articulated by 
the parties in their written submissions. 
Specifically, while this matter has a convoluted procedural history, 
the fact remains that the Complaint against the Defendants, including 
Defendant Quintana, was filed in 2001 and she was not served until late 
2006. The Court determines that the Plaintiff's failure to serve 
Defendant Quintana within the 120-day time period set forth in Rule 4(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to otherwise prosecute this 
LIAO V. EVERGREEN PRODUCTS PAGE 2 MIMUTE ENTRY 
action against her for over five years is inexcusable. Indeed, the 
Plaintiff's assertions that he could not locate Defendant Quintana during 
this time period are simply not credible, particularly since these 
parties attended the same church and lived in the same apartment complex. 
Moreover, if Defendant Quintana's whereabouts were indeed unknown to the 
Plaintiff, then he should have sought to serve her by alternative means. 
The fact that the Plaintiff did not do so underscores his failure to 
diligently prosecute this action. 
In addition to the Plaintiff's failure to timely serve and to 
diligently prosecute his claims, which alone provide sufficient grounds 
to dismiss this action, the Court also determines that the Plaintiff's 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Under these 
circumstances, an amendment of the Plaintiff's Complaint would be futile. 
Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendant Quintana's Motion to 
Dismiss is well-taken and therefore granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons is denied. 
Counsel for Defendant Quintana is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry decision and on the detailed grounds for dismissal 
(including specific citation to the applicable statute of limitations) 
LIAO V. EVERGREEN PRODUCTS PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
discussed in its supporting and reply Memoranda. Counsel is to submit 
the Order to the Court for review and signature. 
Dated this tj\J day of August, 2007. 
t=i 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN (7372) 
DAMON J. GEORGELAS (9751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Beth Quintana 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 3 2007 
' ^ ^ Deputy CltfK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




EVERGREEN PRODUCTS, INC., 
FREDERICK P. NINOW, FREDERICK G. 
NINOW, BETH QUINTANA, DOES I-XX, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED [PROPOSED] ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANT BETH 
QUINTANA'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 010911458 
Judge: Hon. Robert P. Faust 
Oral Argument Requested 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendant Beth Quintana's ("Defendant") 
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff Ching-Ping Liao's ("Plaintiff' or "Ching-Ping") Motion for 
Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve Summons ("Motion to Amend"). On 
September 6, 2007, the Court issued its Minute Entry Decision ("Decision"). In its Decision, the 
Court GRANTED Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice and DENIED Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend. 
1010087.1 
Thus, based on all pleadings and admissible evidence submitted to the Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. The Complaint against Defendant Beth Quintana was filed in 2001. Ms. 
Quintana, however, was not served until late 2006. Plaintiffs failure to serve Defendant within 
the 120-day time period set forth in Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or to 
otherwise prosecute this action against her for over five years constitutes inexcusable delay, 
especially considering that the parties lived in the same apartment complex and attended the 
same church. The fact the Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant by one of the alternative means 
available Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further evidences Plaintiffs 
failure to diligently prosecute this action. 
2. Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any persuasive or legally excusable reason 
why he has failed to take steps to move his claims against Defendant forward in the five years 
since the Complaint was filed, such claims are dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of prosecution. 
3. In addition to Plaintiffs failure to timely serve and diligently prosecute his claim, 
the Court also finds that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations found in Utah 
Code. Ann. §§ 78-12-23, 78-12-25, 78-12-27, and/or 78-12-40. 
4. Accordingly, under these circumstances an amendment of Plaintiffs Complaint 




1. Defendant Beth Quintana's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs 
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice; and 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend and Enlargement of Time to Serve 
Summons is DENIED, 
DATED this £ 3 day of O c 4 o ^ a p —
 n 2007. 
1010087.1 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
* Donald L, Dalton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10I00S7J 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2007,1 caused to be served by United 
States mail, first-class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT BETH QUINTANA'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS, to: 
Donald L. Dalton 
DALTON & KELLEY 
P.O. Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158 
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